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"User-Accountability" Provisions in the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988:
Assaulting Civil Liberties in
the War on Drugs
by
CHRISTOPHER

D.

SULLIVAN*

The imperative necessity for safeguarding [the] rights to procedural due process under the gravest of emergencies has existed
throughout our constitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing
exigencies of crisis, that there is the greatest temptation to dispense
with fundamental constitutional guarantees which, it is feared, will inhibit governmental action. I
The war on drugs is becoming a war against the Constitution. 2
At twelve-thirty in the morning, on the last day of the second session of the 100th Congress, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988. 3 One senator called this legislation "the most comprehensive AntiDrug Abuse Act ever considered in the U.S. Congress."'4 Under the rubric of "user-accountability," Congress also passed the Edwards Amendment, which imposes civil penalties of up to ten thousand dollars for the
possession of small amounts of marijuana, cocaine or other drugs, 5 and
the McCollum Amendment, which denies federal benefits to drug users
and traffickers. 6 These amendments are designed to win the war on
drugs on the demand side. 7 The supply-side provisions of this anti-drug
*

B.A., University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1986; Member, Second Year Class.

1. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1962).
2. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1988, at 1, col. I (quoting Rep. Rangel, Chair, House Select
Committee on Narcotic Abuse and Control).
3. H.R. 5210, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. Hi1,110 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
President Reagan signed the bill into law on November 18, 1988. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
4. 134 CONG. REC. S17,301 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
5. Edwards Amendment, H.R. 5210, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6486, Civil Penalty for
Possession of Small Amounts of Certain ControlledSubstances, 21 U.S.C.A. § 844(a) (West
Supp. 1989) (Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4384 (1988)).
6. McCollum AmendmentDenial ofFederalBenefits to Drug Traffickers and Possessors,
21 U.S.C.A. § 844a(a) (West Supp. 1989).
7. 134 CONG. REc. H7289 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep. McColltm).

[1223]

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

bill," including a death penalty provision for drug traffickers, have attracted much media attention. 9 The user-accountability provisions are,
however, "a more fundamental reordering of Federal anti-drug policy
than the death penalty amendment."' 0 These demand-side measures are
a new approach to controlling drug use in America, an attempt to deter
casual drug users." As Senator Dole explained, "[T]onight we will shift
attention to the other side .... Drug users in this country-whether ad2
dicted or an occasional abuser- . . . are the ones to blame."'

The provision imposing civil fines of up to ten thousand dollars on
individuals for possession of small quantities of drugs' 3 bases the amount
of the penalty on the individual's income and assets.' 4 The penalty is
assessed by the Attorney General's office.' 5 Defendants have an opportunity to contest the sanction in an administrative hearing and can appeal that decision to federal district court.' 6 The Edwards Amendment
is "designed to hold casual drug users accountable for the murderers,
smugglers, pushers and dealers who exist to meet [their] private demand."' 17 It is an attempt to deter drug use by lessening the burden on
prosecutors in punishing casual drug users.
The second major aspect of the new demand-side approach to the
war on drugs gives judges discretion to deny federal benefits to those
8. Other notable provisions in the Act include: a provision for the death penalty for
drug related convictions (§ 7001); expansion of international drug control efforts (Title VII); a
provision to evict families from public housing for drug-related criminal activity (§ 5101); expansion of criminal forfeiture provisions (Title VI, Subtitle B); and a dramatic increase in
criminal penalties for drug convictions (Title VI, Subtitles K - M). H.R. 5210, 134 CONG.
REc. H1,110-217 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
9. See, e.g., Party Politicspush Congress to pass drug bill before election, The Christian
Sci. Monitor, Sept. 19, 1988, National, at 5; Antidrug or Antipeople?, TIME, Sept. 19, 1988 at
20; Editorial, It's a Monster, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 14, 1988, II, at 6, col. 1.
10. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1988, at A10,col. 5. An article in the San Francisco Chronicle
described the user accountability provisions as "strongly reflect[ing] a crusade by conservative
Republicans to hold casual users responsible for drug trafficking and violence." San Francisco
Chron., Oct. 15, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
11. An article in the San Francisco Chronicle described the bill as "bear[ing] the unmistakable stamp of GOP conservatives who contend that the drug trade cannot be reduced unless
a strict policy of 'user accountability' is adopted to discourage demand. Until now, federal law
enforcement policy has been focused almost exclusively on halting the supply of drugs." San
Francisco Chron., Oct. 15, 1988, at 1,col. 5.
12. 134 CONG. REC. S17,303 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Dole). Another
representative stated, "It is time to stop turning the other cheek and start ... taking an eye for
an eye." 134 CONG. REC. H10,710 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Traficant).
13. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
14. 21 U.S.C.A. § 844a(b) (West Supp. 1989).
15. Under the administrative and enforcement provisions of the Drug Abuse Prevention
chapter, of which the Act is now a part, the Attorney General may delegate her functions to
any officer or employee of the Department of Justice. 21 U.S.C.A. § 871(a) (West 1981).
16. Id. § 844a(e-g). See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
17. 134 CONG. REC. H7577 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
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convicted of any federal or state offense involving drug trafficking or
drug possession. 18 Federal benefits include any grants, loans (including
student loans), and professional or commercial licenses provided by federal agencies. 19 For those convicted of drug possession, the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act also authorizes the court, in its discretion, to require the individual to complete successfully a drug treatment program, submit to pe20
riodic drug testing, and perform community service.
This Note argues that these two new measures, the provisions for
civil penalties and the denial of federal benefits, violate individuals' due
process rights and are haphazard, counter-productive attacks on the drug
problem. 2 ' Section I illustrates how these provisions were the products
of election year pressure to fight drugs. 22 Although the provisions represent significant departures from current penal policy, they were considered hastily, resulting in poorly drafted legislation. Section II
demonstrates that the imposition of civil penalties for criminal drug offenses through an administrative hearing is an unconstitutional infringement on the due process rights of criminal defendants. Section III shows
how the denial of federal benefits is a harmful approach to the drug problem, is inconsistent with the goals of the penal system, and violates the
principles of federalism. These two measures curtail individual rights by
imposing punishment without due process and inflicting potentially disproportionate punishment. Congress should abandon these measures in
favor of a more balanced and reasoned response to the problem of drug
ibuse.
I.

Legislative Response to the Drug Problem

The provisions for the imposition of civil penalties and the denial of
federal benefits in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 are an unreasoned
and panicked response to the problem of drug abuse. The first part of
this section describes the mounting frustrations over America's failure to
curb the use of illegal drugs. The second part of this section shows the
18.
19.

21 U.S.C.A. § 853a(a)(1), (b)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
Id. § 853a(d)(1).

20. Id. § 853a (b)(A). Senator Bumpers commented, "What is successful completion?...
What is the meaning? 'Successful completed' [sic] has to have a meaning, What is the meaning? You will not find it in this amendment." 134 CONG. REC. S15,972 (daily ed. Oct. 14,
1988) (statement of Sen. Bumper).
21.

Representative Hayes argued that "the imposition of civil penalties on those not con-

victed of any offense, and the arbitrary deprivation of Federal benefits on individuals in addition to sanctions imposed by the courts, are among the controversial provisions which fly in
the face of the Bill of Rights [and] these expansive provisions are [not] necessary or needed to
win the war on illegal drugs in America." 134 CONG. REC. HI 1,225 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988)
(statement of Rep. Hayes).
22. Time magazine described the election year pressure as a "national frenzy that has
erupted to do something-anything-about drugs and related crime." Church, Thinking the
Unthinkable, TIME, May 30, 1988, at 12.
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results of public pressure to attack the drug problem. By imposing criminal penalties through the civil system, and by denying federal benefits,
the Act's provisions represent a significant change in approach to the use
of criminal sanctions. Yet these measures were rushed through Congress
without a complete examination of the ramifications of these provisions
and despite significant questions about their constitutionality.
A.

Losing the War on Drugs

Since the early 1980s, Congress and the President have been working to crack down on drug use in America. 23 This "war on drugs" has
resulted in various measures such as random drug-testing, civil forfeiture,2 4 pretrial detention, strong criminal penalties, and a weakening of
the exclusionary rule. Many of these measures threaten basic constitu25
tional liberties.
In addition, the government has increased expenditures dramatically to fight the war on drugs, 26 increased law enforcement efforts,2 7 and
expanded the role of the military in drug prevention. 2 It has been acknowledged, however, that the war on drugs is being lost.2 9 The Act
itself states, "despite the impressive rise in law enforcement efforts, the
supply of illegal drugs has increased in recent years."' 30 This increase has
resulted in the drug problem being called a "national emergency," 3 1 the
' 33
"Nation's biggest single problem,"'32 and "a crisis situation.
23.

Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "DrugException" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HAS-

TINGS L.J. 889, 890 (1987).

24. Forfeiture provisions subject certain property to forfeiture to the United States and
extinguish all of the former owner's property rights. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 881 (West Supp.
1989); see generally, Darmstadter and Mackoff, Some Constitutionaland PracticalConsiderations of Civil Forfeitures Under 21 U.S.C. § 881, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 27 (1987) (discussing
constitutionality of the use of civil forfeiture as a sanction to control drug abuse).
25. Id. at 895-913. See also, The War on Drugs: A Search for a Breakthrough, 11 NOVA
L.R. 891, 891-1052 (1987) (reviewing such measures proposed recently and their threat to
constitutional rights).
26. It has been estimated that the Federal Government spends $3.9 billion per year fighting drugs, 134 CONG. REC. S17,307 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Pell), and that
the Reagan Administration spent over $16 billion. Morganthau, Should Drugs be Legal?,
NEWSWEEK, May 30, 1988, at 36.
27. Between 1982 and 1986, Drug Enforcement Administration convictions doubled and
the average sentence for federal cocaine convictions increased by 35%. H.R. 5210, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 5251(a)(18)(C),(D), 134 CONG. REC. H 11,148 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
28. Church, supra note 22, at 19.
29. The Congressional Record of the debate over the Anti-Drug Abuse Act is replete
with statements of legislators who are "convinced that the current war on drugs has been a
losing battle." 134 CONG. REC. S17,307 (daily ed. Oct, 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Pell).
30. H.R. 5210, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5251(a)(21), 134 CONG. REC. HI 1,148 (daily ed.
Oct. 21, 1988).
31. Morganthau, supra note 26, at 36 (quoting President Reagan).
32. 134 CONG. REC. H10,710 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Traficant).
33. 134 CONG. REC. Hl1,230 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Vento).
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In May of 1988, articles in Time and Newsweek explored the possibility of drug legalization as an approach to the drug problem. 34 The
articles declared that drugs were now the voting public's top concern, 35
and recognized that drugs would be a predominant issue in the 1988 election year. 36 These articles indicate that a motivating reason for drug legalization is avoidance of the risk to civil liberties created by anti-drug
measures. Advocates contend that "legalization would remove a severe
threat to individual freedom that is posed by widespread drug searches,
demand for whole-sale testing and the pending use of the military to enforce drug laws."' 37 While legalization seems an extreme response, the
movement for legalization demonstrates the shortcomings of simply concentrating on prosecuting more criminals and increasing penalties for
drug use. The latter approach has not curtailed the use or influx of
drugs.38 This Note argues that Congress needs to change the approach
to the war on drug use by focusing on education, prevention, and treatment rather than punishment.
B. Congressional Reaction
Against the backdrop of the failed war on drugs and the upcoming
election, Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, including the two
amendments aimed at punishing drug users. Members of Congress
"seemed hellbent on demonstrating that they [were] ready to out-tough
the opposition on the drug issue."' 39 Congress ignored warnings from its
own members that "[i]n a crisis, there is often a temptation to posture
and to look tough, regardless of what the effect of legislative action might
actually be upon constitutional rights."' 40 Instead, Congress enacted
34. Church, supra note 22, at 12; Morganthau, supra note 26, at 36. These articles illustrate the mounting frustration over a drug policy that failed despite the efforts of the Reagan
administration and Congress.
35. Morganthau, supra note 26, at 36.
36. Time magazine reported, "Polls show drugs emerging as the hottest issue in the presidential election. In a New York Times-CBS News survey last week, 16% of those questioned
called drugs the nations No. 1 problem." Drugs received more than twice the response of
either unemployment or the federal deficit. Church, supra note 22, at 13, 16.
37. Church, supra note 22, at 15. The Newsweek article recognized similar motivations,
"The argument for legalization comes down to the notion that America's prohibition on drugs
imposes too large a cost in terms of tax dollars, draconian law-enforcement tactics and potential infringement of civil liberties." Morganthau, supra note 26, at 36.
38. Church, supra note 22, at 19 ("[The movement for legalization] reflects the widespread dismay over antidrug efforts that have gone to such discomforting lengths as calling in
the military without noticeably making a dent in crime and abuse problems.").
39. Morganthau, supra note 26, at 36.
40. 134 CONG. REC. H 11,230 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Vento). Congress should have heeded his advice that "it is in precisely those circumstances, in a crisis
situation, where constitutional values are at risk of being abandoned that they must be protected most vigorously." Id.
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these measures, in an attempt to satisfy election year pressure to crack
41
down on drugs.
The debate that preceded passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act indicates the extent to which the political pressure to crack down on drugs
overcame the need to consider carefully this legislation. A member of
Congress even acknowledged "what [Congress was] trying to do in this
election year, and that [was] to prove that we are tougher than we ever
have been on drugs."' 42 The pleas of some members of Congress to address the problem with greater restraint and consideration were ignored. 4 3 A proponent of the measure, Senator Pete Wilson, recognized
the pressure of the election year when he acknowledged that "there is an
election year sensitivity on the part of my colleagues and I am not above
exploiting it."' 44 Members who "had some concern about rushing headlong down this path" 45 seemed overwhelmed by the threat of appearing
soft on drugs.

46

As a result of this election year pressure, Congress expedited procedures to consider the drug measures. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
was the last action by Congress before adjournment. Despite the broad
scope of the Act, Congress considered it for less than four months before
it was passed.4 7 The amendments to the main bill providing for the de41. Congress responded to this pressure despite efforts to "turn attention to the need for
more effective treatment and education efforts, rather than merely more election year frenzy
and posturing." Church, supra note 22, at 19. In the end, Congress was "overpowered by an
election-year push to enact measures." San Francisco Chron., Oct. 15, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
Representative Frenzel declared, "I intend to vote against [this bill] on final passage. I see
little merit in election year exercises." 134 CONG. REC. H7940 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1988)
(statement of Rep. Frenzel).
42. 134 CONG. REC. S15,970 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Evans). Another representative noted, "Almost no committee on the Hill missed an opportunity to get in
on the action. After all, polls indicate that concern about drug abuse is foremost on the minds
of our constituents." 134 CONG. REC. H7293 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Ballenger). It was recognized that "the votes seemed to reflect a widespread concern that the
drug problem [was] a major election issue on which most members wished to display a tough
stance." N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
43. Representative Evans urged Congress to "think a little about what we are doing."
134 CONG. REC. S15,970 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Evans). Representative
Stark implored members to "stop the silliness [and] end the hysteria and redesign our failing
drug policy before it's too late" by focusing more on education, treatment, and prevention.
134 CONG. REC. E2854 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep. Stark).
44. San Francisco Chron., Oct. 15, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
45. 134 CONG. REC. H1,243 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Jeffords).
46. Though voting for the bill, one representative hoped that "following the election ...
the new Congress will bring more balance and sense to bear in addressing this matter." 134
CONG. REC. H 11,230 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Vento). Another considered
that delaying the implementation of the provision for the denial of federal benefits was "a
cautious approach toward user accountability [that] will allow us time to study the effect of
this policy." 134 CONG. REC. HI 1,243 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Jeffords).
47. The bill was introduced on August 11, 1988. H.R. 5210, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134
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nial of federal benefits and
the imposition of civil penalties were consid48
ered even more hastily.
The initial impetus for this legislation began in May of 1988 when a
group of Republican legislators created a task force to develop a drug
bill. 49 On June 16, 1988, the task force introduced a sweeping measure
that included proposals to withhold federal funds from states that did not
revoke for six months the driver's licenses of people convicted of drugrelated offenses, to require mandatory drug testing as a condition of parole, and to study an alternative judicial system using magistrates to
prosecute drug-related offenses.5 0 In response, House Democrats submitted a bill that eventually became the Act that was passed. 51 In August, in the rush to pass a bill before adjournment, the House took the
unusual step of moving into the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union, allowing a consolidated bill proposed by the Rules
Committee to skirt the normal committee process. The House severely
limited debate on the bill and expedited consideration of the amendments.5 2 The House passed a bill on September 22, 1988,53 and sent it to
the Senate for consideration. On October 14, 1988, the Senate passed its
version,5 4 and after a week of negotiation, the two chambers agreed to a
final compromise, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.55 The debate on
the Edwards and McCollum Amendments indicates the limited extent
that they were examined. The Edwards Amendment, providing for the
imposition of civil penalties, came to the floor of the House and Senate
without the usual research and examination to which most proposals are
subject. It was considered by the House although there had been no
hearings on the Amendment.5 6 It passed the House despite serious and
largely unexamined questions 57 about the "unconstitutionality [of] creatCONG. REC. H7060 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988). It was passed on November 18, 1988. Supra

note 3.
48. The amendment providing for the denial of federal benefits was introduced on September 8, 1988, 134 CONG. REC. H7289 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988), and the amendment providing for the civil penalty was introduced on September 14, 1988, 134 CONG. REC. H7576 (daily
ed. Sept. 14, 1988).
49. 134 CONG. REC. H6847 (daily ed. August 11, 1988) (explanation of Rep. Michel).
50. H.R. 6842, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
51. See supra note 47.
52. H.R. Res. 521, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H6846 (daily ed. August 11,
1988).
53. 134 CONG. REC. H7941-42 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1988).
54. 134 CONG. REC. S16,079 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988).
55. H.R. 5210, 100th Cong., 2d sess., 134 CONG. REC. H1 1, 10 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1988).
56. 134 CONG. REC. H7578 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
57. As Representative Stark described it, "We had a chance to recognize the fundamental
principles of the Constitution. The House caved in to pandering to election day desires and
passed several amendments which any fifth grader would question as unconstitutional." 134
CONG. REC. H7940 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Stark).
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ing a civil offense out of a criminal offense" '58 and concerns that a civil
penalty would deny individuals due process rights that are provided in
the criminal justice system. 59 After limiting debate on this amendment
to only thirty minutes, 60 the Senate passed the Edwards Amendment
unanimously.
The McCollum Amendment, which denies federal benefits for certain drug convictions, 6' originally was rejected by the House Judiciary
Committee. It then was considered by the House as a whole without any
committee hearings or public debate. 62 In spite of the novelty of a
63
"whole new approach"

to punishment by denying federal benefits, and

the lack of time to consider it, Congress chose to pass the Amendment
64
immediately. On its face the legislation appears "sloppily drafted."
Significant questions about how the provision can be implemented led
Congress to delay implementation of the Amendment until Sept. 1,
1989,65 leaving it to the President and the regulatory agencies to work
66
out the effect of the law.
As this Note argues, Congress' desire to attack the "demand-side"
of the drug problem by passing legislation that violates constitutional
rights, may have aggravated rather than alleviated the problem. Because
of their rush to enact these provisions, Congress failed to respond to both
constitutional and policy concerns.
58. 134 CONG. REC. H7581 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
59. The original House version appears more vulnerable to constitutional attack than is
the final version of the civil penalties provision. Senator Kennedy, who negotiated and eventually supported the final Senate version, said he "[was] convinced [the House version] is unconstitutional, on the basis of a number of Supreme Court decisions." 134 CONG. REc. S 15,762
(daily ed. Oct. 13, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
60. 134 CONG. REC. S15,760 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1988). The Senate considered the
amendment at about 7 o'clock at night and seemed extremely anxious to finish business for the
day. Id.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 157-58.
62. As a member of the House Judiciary Committee explained, "Not one hearing or
other shred of evidence was presented to the committee to prove the deterrent value of denying
Federal benefits." 134 CONG. REC. H7291 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep. Cardin).
63. 134 CONG. REC. S15,974 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Dodd). Senator
Dodd went on to express concern about the questions raised by the bill and the lack of time to
study them adding "my hope would be that we might come back to this amendment, [and]
craft it a bit more tightly." Id. at S15,977.
64. 134 CONG. REC. S15,971 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
65. See infra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
66. Senator Levin commented, "[Tihis amendment is being considered too hastily ....
We cannot abdicate our task of writing good law and leave it up to regulatory agencies and the
courts to clean up our sloppy work.... [T]his amendment seems to me too ill-considered and
too poorly drafted." 134 CONG. REC. S15,977 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Levin).

THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1988

August 1989]

II.

Civil Penalties for Possession of Drugs

The first of the new demand-side measures is the Edwards Amendment. This provision subjects anyone who knowingly possesses a controlled substance for personal use to civil fines of up to ten thousand
dollars per violation. 67 These civil penalties are in addition to any crimiamount of the penalty is based
nal penalties that could be imposed. The
68
on an individual's income and assets.
After an opportunity for an administrative hearing pursuant to the
Administrative Procedures Act, 69 a penalty is assessed through the Attorney General's Office. 70 The standard of proof at the administrative

hearing is a preponderanceof the evidence,71 rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, and many of the other protections traditionally afforded a
crimihal defendant would be unavailable. 72 A defendant could appeal
the administrative decision to federal district court for judicial review de
novo, however, with an opportunity for a jury, the right to counsel, and
the right to confront witnesses. 73 The standard of proof in this review is
beyond a reasonable doubt. 74 A first time offender also has the opportunity to expunge a disposition from the record if after three years she has
paid the fine, has not been convicted of another federal or state drug
to a drug test, and such test shows the
offense, and "agrees to submit
'75
individual to be drug free."
This provision is unconstitutional because it denies individuals their
due process rights by inflicting an essentially criminal sanction 76 on defendants through the civil system. It seeks to employ a civil sanction "as
a punishment ... without affording the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. ' 77 The following section will
67.

21 U.S.C.A. § 844a(a) (West Supp. 1989) (Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4384

(1988)).
68. Id. § 844a(b).
69. Id. § 844a(e). The Administrative Procedures Act is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-57
(1982).
70. Id. § 844a(e).
71. See infra note 81.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 79-101.
73. 21 U.S.C.A. § 844a(g) (West Supp. 1989).
74. Id.
75. Id. § 844a(j).
76. The Congressional Record makes it clear that the section is designed to "impose civil
fines.of up to $10,000... through administrative procedures, severely punishing drug users
without burdening our courts." 134 CONG. REc. S17,303 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement
of Sen. Dole) (emphasis added).
77. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165-66 (1963) (footnote omitted). The
fifth amendment provides that, "No person ... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to
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review the procedures that will be used in the initial administrative hearing, illustrating the lack of due process protections. This section then
will demonstrate that under "the tests traditionally applied [by the
Supreme Court] to decide whether an Act of Congress is penal or regulatory in character,"'7 8 the civil fines in this legislation clearly are intended
to be punitive in nature and because they lack adequate due process protections are unconstitutional.
A. The Nature of the Original Administrative Hearing
Under the Edwards Amendment, the Attorney General must pro79
vide written notice before assessing a civil penalty for possession.
Within thirty days of this notice, an individual may request a hearing. 80
In addition to a lower standard of proof,8 ' administrative hearings to
administer civil sanctions generally proceed informally, 82 a dramatically
different approach from criminal prosecutions.
In administrative hearings, the rules both for gathering evidence and
for using evidence differ from those in criminal proceedings. The scope
of discovery and the power to subpoena evidence is left largely to the
discretion of the administrative agency. 83 Since the Federal Rules of Evi85
dence do not apply,8 4 all evidence, including hearsay, is admissible.

be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; ... and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
78. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168.
79. 21 U.S.C.A. § 844a(e) (West Supp. 1989).
80. Id.
81. The standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96-104, reh'g denied 451 U.S. 933 (1980);
Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1429-30 (10th Cir. 1984). See also United States v. Regan, 232
U.S. 37, 47-48 (1914) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt required only in criminal cases). "Absent statutory specifications of particular standards of proof, the APA [Administrative Procedures Act] requires that determinations in adjudicatory proceedings be made in accordance
with the preponderance of the evidence standard." L. MODJESKA, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

4.17 (1982).

82. See L. MODJESKA, supra note 81, at § 4.
83. E.g., Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. F.E.R.C., 746 F.2d 1383, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1984);
F.T.C. v. Anderson, 631 F.2d 741, 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 1979); McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d
1278, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1979); L. MODJESKA, supra note 81, at § 4.18. The issuance of a subpoena is provided for by 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1982).
84. E.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1948), reh'g
denied, 334 U.S. 839 (1948); Second Taxing Dist. of City of Norwalk v. F.E.R.C., 683 F.2d
477, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 906 (1981); Klinestiver v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 606 F.2d 1128, 1130 (D.C. Cir.
1979). This means "[s]imply this-that an agency may admit what evidence it chooses, regardless of whether the evidence is admissible under the exclusionary rules." B. SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 336 (1976). For a discussion of the application of the exclusionary
rule in administrative hearings see Note, Exclusionary Rule In Administrative Proceedings, 66
IOWA L. REV. 343, 355-83 (1981) (authored by Randall R. Steichen).
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Many of the rights guaranteed to criminal defendants by the fifth
and sixth amendments are not provided for in administrative hearings.
There is no fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 6 There
is no right to a jury trial, 87 no right to the assistance of counsel, 88 and no
protection against double jeopardy because the double jeopardy clause
protects only against consecutive criminal punishments. 89 Moreover,
there is no guarantee of a right to confront witnesses, 90 and the right to
cross examine witnesses is limited. 9 1
The Supreme Court has deemed these rights fundamental to the
American scheme of criminal justice and protected them against federal
and state encroachment. 92 Because of the seriousness of criminal penalties and the stigma of criminal convictions, the criminal justice system
provides stringent procedural protections. These safeguards help to ensure that criminal punishment is not imposed arbitrarily, and that the
outcomes of criminal proceedings are reliable. 93 In Helvering v. Mitchell,94 the Supreme Court recognized that Congress should not disregard
these due process rights by sanctioning individuals through a civil system. The Court in Helvering stated that "civil procedure is incompatible
85. Hoska v. United States Dep't of the Army, 677 F.2d 131, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Calhoun, 626 F.2d at 148; Klinestiver, 606 F.2d at 1130.

86. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248, reh'g denied, 488 U.S. 916 (1980).
87. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1982); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164 (1963).
88. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 164. The Attorney General is not obliged to provide an attorney in the event a defendant could not afford to provide her own. The Administrative Procedures Act does, however, allow a defendant to be assisted by counsel during a hearing. 5
U.S.C. § 555(b) (1982).
89. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
90. Id. at 403-04.

91. E.g., Cellular Mobile Sys. of Pa. v. F.C.C., 782 F.2d 182, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Solis
v. Schweiker, 719 F.2d 301, 302 (9th Cir. 1983); Central Freight Lines v. United States, 669
F.2d 1063, 1068 (5th Cir. 1982); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 880
(Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978).
92. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969) (protection against double jeopardy); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965) (right to confront witnesses and to crossexamination); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
93. The Supreme Court has said that due process "rules are historically grounded rights
of our system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1969). In an article discussing the distinction between civil and criminal penalties, Professor Clark described due process safeguards:
The purposes of these safeguards can be generally stated as to ensure so far as possible that conviction will not be based on error, to prevent abuses and excesses against
defendants (particularly with regard to compelled testimony) that might result in
emotionally charged cases, and, related to the last, to avoid the use of repetitious
prosecution to harass, intimidate, or wrongfully convict defendants.
Clark, Civil and CriminalPenaltiesand Forfeitures:A Frameworkfor ConstitutionalAnalysis,
60 MINN. L. REv. 379, 432-33 (1976) (footnote omitted).
94. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
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with the accepted rules and constitutional guaranties governing the trial

of criminal prosecutions . .

. .

95

It was precisely to avoid the mechanisms of criminal procedure that
Congress enacted this measure. 96 Proponents contended that this "alternative [to the] criminal justice system"' 97 would "significantly reduc[e]
the Government's burden" 9 8 of prosecution by removing the protections
normally afforded defendants. As Representative Glickman said, "[T]he
whole idea is to go the civil way instead of the criminal way because of
the lower standard of proof." 99
The Senate, when it amended the House version, recognized some of
the problems with the transformation of a criminal penalty to a civil
sanction. 100 The final bill provides that judicial review of the administrative hearing in federal district court be conducted de novo. The de novo
review provides the right to a jury trial, to counsel, to confront witnesses,
and requires that the standard of proof be beyond a reasonable doubt.10 1
The protections added by de novo review fail to remedy the
problems arising from the provision for civil penalties. For example, the
protections arise only after an individual first requests an administrative
hearing. Only after that hearing is conducted can an individual initiate
an action for judicial review in district court. Requiring an individual
and counsel to prepare for and attend an administrative hearing and a
trial is an expensive and time consuming process. The administrative
proceeding also does not include the right to a speedy trial contained in
the sixth amendment. Full judicial protections should be guaranteed at
the initial fact-finding level, without forcing an unreasonable burden on
the defendant to appeal.
Because administrative and civil proceedings vary significantly from
criminal proceedings, the latter having extensive due process protections,
the Edwards Amendment is subject to constitutional attack. The next
part of this section examines the constitutionality of using the civil sys95. Id. at 402-04 (footnotes omitted).
96. A proponent of the Edwards Amendment said, "When you [impose a civil fine], the
burden of proof is by the preponderance of the evidence instead of beyond a reasonable doubt."
134 CONG. REC. H7580 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. McCollum). See also
Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protectionsfor Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 478, 480 (1974) (To escape due process protections legislators are increasingly labelling statutes as civil-not criminal); Clark, supra note 93, at 38.
97. 134 CONG. REC. S15,762 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
98. 134 CONG. REC. H7578 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Fish).
99. 134 CONG. REC. H7580 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
100. The House inserted the provision for de novo review and jury trial to try to develop a
constitutional provision. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. One senator stated,
"Many of the troublesome provisions in the House-passed bill have been deleted in favor of
constitutionality ...." 134 CONG. REC. S17,310 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Cranston).
101. 21 U.S.C.A. § 844a(g) (West Supp. 1989).
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tem to impose fines of up to ten thousand dollars for the possession of
drugs.
B.

The Constitutionality of the Civil Penalties

The civil penalties in the Edwards Amendment are an unconstitu-.
tional attempt to impose criminal punishment through the civil system.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the legislature cannot dispense
with a defendant's constitutional rights by labelling criminal punishment

a civil sanction and imposing it through the civil system.10 2 As Professor
Charney notes, "criminal prosecutions masquerading as civil penalties
will not be tolerated." 0 3 Prescribing civil procedures for a criminal
sanction violates due process requirements.' ° 4
The Court has upheld civil penalties if they are remedial and regulatory, but not if they are designed to punish.' 0 5 "The question, then, is
whether a... proceeding is intended to be, or by its nature necessarily is,
criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial."' 0 6 In United States v.
Ward, 07 the Supreme Court indicated that a two-pronged inquiry is used

to answer this question:
First, we have set out to determine whether Congress, in establishing
the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a
preference for one label or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further
whether the statutory scheme was
so punitive either in purpose or ef08
fect as to negate that intention.1

If either the objective manifestations of congressional purpose' 0 9 in enacting the legislation are punitive, or the nature and effect of the statute
102. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 184 (1963); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922).
103. Charney, supra note 96, at 482. See Darmstadter & Mackoff, supra note 24, at 46
("[A]s early as 1886, the Supreme Court recognized the hypocrisy in merely labelling as civil a
procedure carrying obvious punitive ramifications, and thereby stripping the claimant of fundamental constitutional guarantees.").
104. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution mandates that "punishment
cannot be imposed without a prior criminal trial and all its incidents, including indictment,
notice, confrontation, jury trial, assistance of counsel, and compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses," Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 167.
105. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 167 ("If the sanction these sections impose is punishment
..
the procedural safeguards required as incidents of a criminal prosecution are lacking.");
Charney, supra note 96, at 483; Clark, supra note 93, at 382, 385-97.
106. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1983) (referring
to a § 924(e) forfeiture proceeding by the government to seize firearms from unlicensed
dealers).
107. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
108. Id. at 248-49 (citations omitted).
109. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169.
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is penal, the legislation is invalid."10 Under both prongs of this test the
Edwards Amendment is unconstitutional.
(1) CongressionalIntent
Under the first prong of the Ward test, the Court seeks to determine
if there is "evidenc[e of] a Congressional desire to punish.""'I In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,112 the Supreme Court looked to the legislative history and invalidated a civil sanction "because the objective
manifestations of congressional purpose indicate conclusively that the
provisions in question can only be interpreted as punitive."' ' 13 Similarly,
the legislative history of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act's civil fines clearly
shows that Congress intended these civil penalties to be punitive, but
sought to facilitate their imposition by removing them from the criminal
justice system.
The measure was designed to punish. Proponents of the measure

described it as a "tough and much needed penalt[y]," 114 which sends "a
simple message... [i]f you use drugs-and you get caught, expect to pay
the price in either criminal or civil penalties or both." ' 1 5 This measure
was designed to impose punishment without the burdens of the criminal
justice system, rather than to impose a regulatory or remedial scheme.
Representative Edwards stated:
It does not replace any criminal penalty or decriminalize drug use in
any way, in fact it does the exact opposite-it adds a civil penalty to
the already existing criminal sanctions in a calculated effort to give law
enforcement a new and effective means of dealing with small time users
because of our already
whose actions would otherwise be 1ignored
16
overburdened criminal court system.
110. See, e.g., One Assortment of 89 Firearms,465 U.S. at 362-66; Ward, 448 U.S. at 24849; Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169.
111. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960).
112. 372 U.S. 144, 164 (1962).
113. Id. at 169.
114. 134 CONG. REC. S17,308 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
115. 134 CONG. REC. H7577 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Edwards). Together with the denial of federal benefits it was enacted to become "a double-edged weapon
against those who have invited these ruthless and violent traffickers ... into our front yard ...
severely punishing drug users." 134 CONG. REC. S17,303 (Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Dole). In what would seem to be a hopelessly optimistic statement, another senator declared,
"[I]n reality, the amendment before us now is going to do more to drive a stake in the heart of
the drug industry than the death penalty and all the money we are spending on enforcement."
134 CONG. REC. S15,762 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1988) (statement of Sen. Gramm). It was said to
be a "zero tolerance operation.... Every person found in possession of a controlled substance
would be slapped with a Federal civil penalty." 134 CONG. REC. H7578 (Sept. 14, 1988)
(statement of Rep. Fish).
116. 134 CONG. REC. 7577 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Edwards). Earlier
he said the amendment was a response to "frustration . . . from the inability of our criminal
courts to effectively stop drug use." Id.
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Supporters made it clear that they felt the "futility of arresting drug law
violators when the court and prison system is too overburdened"117
meant that we need other "penaltiesand sanctions against the 23 million
people who use drugs.""1 8
As in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the objective manifestations of
congressional intent reveal that they intended to punish. This type of
penalty, because of its criminal nature, cannot be imposed through the
civil system because it denies defendants due process of the law. 1 9 Congress cannot, as Representative Glickman noted, "use civil penalties, in
effect, for a punitive purpose [because it] clearly violates the Constitution."1 20 Because the legislative history shows that Congress intended to
punish by imposing civil fines, the fines are unconstitutional under the
first prong of the Ward test.
The punitive purpose, and resulting unconstitutionality of these civil
fines, is illustrated further by examining the results that Congress intended the imposition of these sanctions to have.
(2) The Nature and Effect of the Civil Fines
The second prong of the test the Supreme Court uses to examine the
constitutional validity of a civil sanction examines the sanction's purpose
and effect.' 21 For this inquiry the Supreme Court relies1 2 2 on the seven
factors laid out in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez123 These factors are:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a puhishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose for which it may rationally be connected is assignable to it, and whether it24appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned ....1

117. 134 CONG. REC. S17,308 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
118. 134 CONG. REC. S15,762 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1988) (statement of Sen. Gramm) (emphasis added).
119. As the Court said in Kennedy, "[I]n keeping with.. . cherished traditions, punishment cannot be imposed 'without due process of law.'" 372 U.S. at 186. See United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313-18 (1946), for an example of the Court striking down a law designed
to inflict punishment without a full judicial trial. For discussions of the Court's use of legislative history to determine if a civil penalty is designed to punish and not as remedial or regulatory penalty, see generally, Charney, supra note 96, at 492-94; Clark, supra note 93, at 436-39;
Darmstadter & Markoff, supra note 24, at 46-49.
120. 134 CONG. REC. H7581 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
121. See supra text accompanying note 108.
122. See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365 (1984);
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537-38 (1979);
Darmstadter & Mackofi, supra note 24, at 46-49.
123. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
124. Id. at 168-69 (citations omitted).
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These should be evaluated as a whole, although "some may point in different directions."' 125 These factors are neither "exhaustive nor dispositive"' 126 but provide guidance for deciding whether a sanction is a civil
remedy, or in effect a criminal penalty.127 Using these factors to examine
the Edwards Amendment demonstrates that the civil sanctions are penal
in nature and effect and therefore unconstitutional.
The first two factors are whether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint, and whether the sanction traditionally has been
regarded as punishment. Although civil fines do not involve an affirmative disability or restraint, and are often used as civil sanctions, these
facts alone are not conclusive.
Civil fines should be remedial and compensatory. 12 8 The Edwards
Amendment provides for fines as high as ten thousand dollars based
upon an individual's income and assets 29 as a means to punish the offender, not to compensate for any harm. 130 The fine does not "serve[]
remedial purposes dissociated from punishment"' 13 but is a fine administered as a penalty for criminal actions. 32 Fines are quite common as a
criminal sanction. In fact, the present criminal penalty for simple possession of a controlled substance is a fine of not less than one thousand
dollars, and up to five thousand dollars, in addition to a possible jail term
of up to a year. 133 The desire of Congress is not to change, and certainly
not to diminish, the penalty, 134 but rather to change the method for applying it. Because Congress believed that overcrowded jails prevented
135
individuals from being sentenced to jail terms for possession of drugs, 36
the civil fines they enacted were designed to inflict a greater sanction. 1
Congress did not want to lessen the penalty, but to facilitate its imposition. As such, the civil fines in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act represent a
criminal penalty and not a civil remedy.
125. Id. at 169.
126. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 256 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
129. 21 U.S.C.A. § 844a(a) (West Supp. 1989).
130. This is clear from the legislative history. As Representative Shaw said, "yes, a millionaire is going to be punished a lot more than an individual who is down near the poverty
level. It is assessed just as we do now in civil cases as to punitive damages." 134 CONG. REC.
H7579 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Shaw) (emphasis added).
131.
Ward, 448 U.S. at 246.
132. Cf 448 U.S. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (fine was a penalty aimed at exacting
retribution, not as a regulatory measure, and should be considered a criminal sanction).
133. 21 U.S.C.A. § 844(a) (West Supp. 1988).
134. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. Congress also wanted to remove procedural barriers to prosecutions. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
136. Because the maximum fine under the existing criminal law is $5,000, 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 844(a) (West Supp. 1988), the maximum $10,000 fine provided for in the Edwards Amendment would double the penalty.
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The third factor is whether the sanction is applied only upon a finding of scienter or knowledge. The question of whether the sanction requires knowledge is an important indicator of penal intent because of its
implication of culpability. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act specifically applies
only to an individual who "knowingly possesses a controlled substance."' 37 Because a penalty attaches upon a finding of blameworthiness, knowing possession, or criminal culpability, the penal nature of this
38
statute is evident.'
The fourth factor to consider is whether the penalty will promote
the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence. This is
precisely what the Act's civil fines are designed to do. The legislative
history is plain that "[flining persons found guilty of possession could act
as a deterrent for users or [sic] drugs."'' 39 There was also a strong retributive impulse behind the penalty: "Society has become increasingly disgusted with the crime, death, and human waste that your dirty habit
spawns. If the courts are too crowded... we will find another way to
hold you accountable for what you do to our children. . ...40 The
Amendment sought to promote the traditional aims of punishment in a
nontraditional way because of the belief that "nothing is being done to
14
punish [users] today."' '
The fifth factor to determine the nature of the sanctions is whether
the behavior to which the sanction applies is already a crime. Of course,
"[c]urrent law is very clear. Drug use is a crime."' 42 Not only is the
possession of drugs already a crime, but the civil fines are a penalty that
can be applied in addition to criminal sanctions. When, as here, the behavior is recognized as a crime, an individual is entitled to her constitutional right of procedural due process. Professor Hart has written that
"what distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction ...is the judgment
of community condemnation which accompanies [it].' 14 3 A finding that
137. 21 U.S.C.A. § 844a(a) (West Supp. 1989).
138. Cf Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922) ("Scienter is associated with penalties, not with taxes.").
139. 134 CONG. REC. HI1,233 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Whitten).
Representative McCollum said, "if we are really going to deter use, we are really going to have
to do some pretty tough things.., we need to come down on all kinds of folks in society who
are using drugs."
McCollum).

134 CONG. REC. H7580 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Rep.

140. 134 CONG. REC. H7577 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
There are similar statements expressing a desire to "strike[] at the real drug kingpin ...the
drug user" who "ha[s] put a drug thug at the door of every high school in America, and...
create[d] the profits that produce drug gangs that kill our agents." 134 CONG. REc. S15,762

(daily ed. Oct. 13, 1988) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
141. 134 CONG. REC. S15,761 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1988) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
142. 134 CONG. REC. H7578 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
143.

Hart, The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 401, 404 (1958).

Professor Hart continues that it is not the label a legislature attaches to conduct that identifies
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an individual has used drugs, whether determined through the civil or
criminal system, carries the potential for moral condemnation. The difference in the stigma attaching to a civil penalty has been used to justify
imposing civil penalties. 144 The stigma that may attach to a "disposition" in the Act's civil penalty provision illustrates the criminal nature of
the sanction.
The provision by Congress of expungement proceedings 145 also reflects an awareness that the civil penalties imposed by the Act are
designed to attach to a serious crime. The expungement procedure allows an individual to expunge the disposition from the record after three
years if she has not been convicted of any other drug-related offenses and
passes a drug test. 146 By providing for expungement, Congress acknowledged that a "conviction" in this civil proceeding results not only in a
large fine but carries with it a stigma and record of disposition. Senator
Kennedy described the expungement procedure as providing "an individual... found to have violated the law .... a right to have his or her record
expunged in terms of that conviction, which I think can provide an important incentive. ....,,147
The Act's civil penalties apply to criminal behavior, and are imposed only after a finding that an individual has violated criminal law.
In United States v. Constantine,148 the Supreme Court acknowledged that
this kind of scheme reflects the criminal nature of a sanction saying,
"The condition of the imposition is the commission of a crime. This...
is again significant of penal and prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of revenue."' 149 Thus, analysis of the Edwards Amendment according to the fifth factor clearly indicates a criminal nature of that provision.
The remaining factors examine whether there is an alternative purpose of the sanction and whether the sanction appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose. The only purposes that Congress
acknowledged in passing this provision were deterrence and punishment-which are penal in character. 5 0 A civil sanction should be
a crime, but a crime is "conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal
and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community." Id. at 405.
144. See Charney, supra note 96, at 496; Clark, supra note 93, at 406-10.
145. 21 U.S.C.A. § 844a(j) (West Supp. 1989).
146. Id.
147. 134 CONG. REC. S15,762 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1988) (emphasis added) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy).
148. 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
149. Id. at 295; see also United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354,
365 (1984) (The fact that actions giving rise to civil forfeiture penalty are also a crime suggests
that the penalty is criminal in nature); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1980)
(Only one consideration aids respondent: that the penalty attaches to behavior that is already a
crime).
150. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), the Supreme Court said, "in deciding whether
or not a law is penal, this Court has generally based its determination upon the purpose of the
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designed to regulate, 15 ' and there is no evidence that the Edwards
Amendment was designed to regulate, not to deter and punish, drug use.
In sum, these factors reveal that the legislation is punitive in nature
and effect and is thus an unconstitutional attempt to impose criminal
punishment through the civil system. The civil penalty provisions of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act are invalid under either prong of the test the
Supreme Court has established to determine the validity of civil sanctions. The test the Supreme Court has established serves a very important function of protecting the due process rights of individuals. As the
Supreme Court has written, "Our forefathers 'intended to safeguard the
people of this country from punishment without trial by duly constituted
courts.' ",152 Therefore, "the Bill of Rights which we guard so jealously
and the procedures it guarantees are not to be abrogated merely because
a guilty man may escape prosecution or for any other expedient
53
reason." 1
Requiring the government to prove its case fully before imposing
essentially criminal sanctions better serves penal goals. It may foster respect for the criminal justice system and serve to educate the offender by
formalizing the determination of guilt. It seems that the government
may hope defendants will bypass even the initial administrative hearing,
allowing the Attorney General to fine suspects without opposition. But
it is questionable whether this process will actually serve to diminish the
perceived seriousness of the offense. In any case, it is not worth abandoning the constitutional safeguards of the criminal justice system in
pursuit of expediency.
Finally, there is a strong equal protection concern stemming from
this provision. The civil fines serve as an alternative (or in addition to) to
pursuing criminal sanctions. They are designed to "hold yuppie users
accountable for their action."' 54 Because the amount of the fine is based
on an individual's income and assets, prosecutors may be inclined to proceed administratively for wealthy suspects and criminally prosecute
poorer ones.' 55 Congress tried to allay this concern by providing that the
statute. If a statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment-that is to reprimand
the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc., it has been considered penal." Id. at 96 (citations
omitted).
151. Supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 208 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The question of whether or not a statute is
punitive ultimately depends upon whether the disability it imposes is for the purpose of vengeance or deterrence, or whether the disability is but an incident to some broader regulatory
objective.").
152. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 166 (quoting United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317 (1946)).
153. Id. at 184.
154. 134 CONG. REC. H7939 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Smith).
155. As Representative Glickman argued,
[T]his is an unconstitutional amendment because utilization of its provisions will be
largely based on the abilities to pay the fines. A very rich person who is subject to
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"income and assets of an individual shall not be relevant to" deciding
whether or not to pursue civil penalties.156 That may be easier said than
done, however. In reality it may be that federal prosecutors would rely
heavily on an individual's wealth in determining which sanction to seek.
III.

Denial of Federal Benefits

The other major demand-side measure of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
is the McCollum Amendment. It provides that persons convicted of
drug trafficking or possession of drugs may be denied federal benefits.
Any person "convicted of any Federal or State offense consisting of the
distribution of controlled substances" may, at the discretion of the court,
be ineligible for all federal benefits for up to five years. 157 These include
"any grant, contract, loan [including student loans], professional license,
or commercial license provided by an agency of the United States.' 1 58
After a second conviction for drug trafficking, the benefits may be denied
for ten years 159 and "upon a third or subsequent conviction for such offense [the defendant would] be permanently ineligible for all Federal
0
benefits." 16
For those convicted of drug possession the McCollum Amendment
provides a different procedure. Any person "convicted of any Federal or
State offense involving the possession of a controlled substance"', 6 1 shall,
at the discretion of the court: (1) be ineligible for federal benefits for one
year; (2) be required to "successfully complete an approved drug treatment program which includes periodic testing to insure that the individual remains drug free;" (3) "be required to perform appropriate
community service;" or (4) any combination of the above clauses. 62 At
the discretion of the court, a second conviction could result in the denial
of benefits for up to five years, and any combination of the above four
this particular provision will, in all likelihood, [b]e treated differently than a very
poor person. That clearly violates the 14th amendment to the Constitution, the equal
protection clause. Therefore, I think it will be struck down.
134 CONG. REc. H7580-81 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
156. 21 U.S.C.A. § 844a(b) (West Supp. 1989).
157. 21 U.S.C.A. § 253a(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1989) (Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4310
(1988)). A conviction for distribution of controlled substances is defined by reference to the
Controlled Substances Act. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a) (West Supp. 1988).
158. Id. § 253a(d)(1)(A).
159. Id. § 253a(a)(1)(B).
160. Id. § 253a(a)(1)(C).
161. Id. § 253a(b)(1). A drug or narcotic offense is defined broadly by reference to Section
404(c) of the Controlled Substances Act as "any offense which proscribes the possession, distribution, manufacture, cultivation, sale, transfer, or attempt or conspiracy to possess, distribute,
manufacture, cultivate, sell or transfer any substance the possession of which is prohibited
under this subchapter." 21 U.S.C.A. § 844(C) (West Supp. 1988).
162. 21 U.S.C.A. § 253a(b)(A)(i-iv) (West Supp. 1989).
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clauses. 163 The section provides that the ineligibility for federal benefits
would be suspended if the individual completes a supervised drug rehabilitation program, has otherwise been rehabilitated, or is unable after a
good faith attempt to gain admission to, or pay for, a qualified drug rehabilitation program. 164
Congress left open a number of questions as to how these provisions
can be implemented, particularly how they will be enforced by federal
agencies and the role of state courts in administering these penalties. 165
For example, it is not clear whether the McCollum Amendment authorizes state courts to impose federal penalties.' 66 Despite the confusion, a
provision in the bill was eliminated that would have mandated the "drugczar"' 167 to conduct a study and hold public hearings to determine if the
denial of federal benefits would have a positive effect and deter drug use,
and which benefits should be included. 68 Instead, Congress passed the
bill without any further study of the effects of the provision. 169 Implementation of the section was delayed, however, until September 1,
1989,170 "thereby giving the next President and Congress, and possibly
the courts, an opportunity to reexamine this issue before it impacts the
innocent or places a double-jeopardy type of penalty in law."' 17 1 In the
interim, on or before May 1, 1989, the President is obliged to transmit to
163. Id. § 253a(b)(B).
164. Id. § 253a(c).
165. See infra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
166. As one senator pointed out:
One aspect [of this amendment] which has not been commented upon is a surprise to
this Senator. It is the provision as contained in the amendment, anyone convined
[sic] of any Federal or State offense consisting of the distribution of controlled substances shall have these penalties at the discretion of the court. I have never heard of
a Federal act which authorizes a State court to impose sentence in a State court.
That simply is not done. The Federal Government, simply stated, does not have the
authority to pass a law which will authorize the State court to impose a penalty in a
given set of facts. If that were to be true, what happens to Federalism in this
country?
134 CoNo. REC. S15,975 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Specter).
167. The "drug-czar," officially the Director of National Drug Control Policy, is a cabinet
level position to coordinate national anti-drug efforts that was created by the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1501). William Bennett, the new "drug-czar," has pledged to do all he can to win the war on drugs "even
going on the Oprah Winfrey Show." Los Angeles Times, July 19, 1989, I, at 4, Col. 1.
168. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 253a (West Supp. 1989).
169. During the debate, one senator addressed this issue:
The Drug Czar will be studying precisely the issue this amendment attempts to address. It is better that Congress make a considered judgment about the pluses and
minuses of denying Federal benefits following the study we have mandated. This
amendment is contrary to the bipartisan drug bill before us today and is a perfect
example of "putting the cart before the horse."
134 CONG. REC. S15,977 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Levin).
170. 21 U.S.C.A. § 253a(h) (West Supp. 1989).
171. 134 CONG. REC. HlI,230 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Vento).
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Congress a report delineating the role of state courts in implementing
this section, describing how federal agencies will enforce the section, detailing the means by which federal and state agencies and courts will
share the necessary information, and recommending any modifications. 72 Congress then will consider the report and enact appropriate
73
changes. 1
Denying federal benefits to individuals who already have been convicted of a federal or state drug offense is a counterproductive approach
to the problem of drug abuse. The following section will demonstrate
that the potential harm of the measure outweighs its usefulness. For example, denying drug users benefits such as student loans, or other governmental aid, may prevent individuals from rehabilitating themselves
and reinforce a cycle of poverty for low income individuals. The section
then will argue that this new approach is contrary to many goals of the
penal system and does not further any of the goals of punishment. It
provides for disproportionate sentences, will not deter drug use, and may
be enforced arbitrarily or discriminatorily. Finally, the section will show
that passing federal legislation that has the effect of increasing state penalties for criminal offenses violates the principles of federalism.
A.

The Effect of Denying Federal Benefits

The first step in evaluating the proposal is to examine its effects. It
appears that the most likely result of denying federal benefits will be to
hinder the rehabilitation of individuals convicted of drug offenses. The
federal benefits that may be withdrawn include grants, loans (including
74
It
student loans), professional or commercial licenses and contracts.
does not, however, include Social Security, welfare, or veteran's benefits.' 75 Originally, the House version of this provision would have made
any individual convicted of a drug offense ineligible for public housing
and veteran's benefits.' 76 The Senate removed this language but provided that if any public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's
household, or any guest of the tenant's, engages in drug-related criminal
172. 21 U.S.C.A. § 253a(g)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
173. Id. § 253a(g)(2). So far the only action in Congress has been the introduction of bills
in the House and Senate that would eliminate the judge's discretion, making the withdrawal of
federal benefits mandatory, and including welfare in the list of federal benefits that would be
withdrawn. See 135 CONG. REC. S9940 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (explanation of Sen. Wallop);
S. 1492, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 2523, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
174. Id. § 253a(d).
175. Id. § 253a(d)(1)(B). The version the House passed, however, included both veteran's
benefits and public housing. 134 CONG. REC. H7289 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988).
176. H.R. 5210, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6801(c)(1)(A), 134 CONG. REC. H7289 (daily ed.
Sept. 8, 1988).
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activity near the housing complex, it shall be grounds for terminating
that tenancy. 177
The withdrawal of federal benefits is designed to tell drug users,
"You are not going to be treated like a respected member of our society
... [w]e are not going to provide [Federal benefits] to people who are
profiteering off the health and happiness of our children." 178 One representative said,
To the middle class drug user, we say, you can lose very important
Federal benefits. To America's lawyers we say, if you're convicted of
using drugs, you can lose your license to practice law. To America's
doctors we say, if you're convicted of using drugs, you can lose your
license to prescribe drugs. To Wall Street we say, if you're convicted
of using drugs, you can lose your securities brokers license. 179
The potential harm of this provision outweighs its usefulness. 180
First, the denial of federal benefits to people who are convicted of drug
offenses "mandates a punishment that is outrageously inhumane . . .
[and] works directly against reintegration of individuals who have already served their sentence."' 8 1 It "suspend[s] Federal aid for the people
who need that very assistance to defeat the circle of drug abuse, and
entirely circumvent[s] our court system."' 182 It ignores the reality that
the problem of drug abuse, particularly in the inner cities has multi-faceted roots. 183 For many, drugs are a part of their life from childhood.
The federal government needs to offer people alternatives, not to abandon them or fail to treat them with respect.
Unfortunately, this kind of one-dimensional thinking severely limits
this country's ability to approach the drug problem constructively. Instead of looking at the problems created by the cycle of poverty and
spending money on education and job training to offer individuals meaningful alternatives in life, this Amendment seeks to do the opposite-cut
off what little help exists.184 It is symptomatic of a desire to punish the
177. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (102 Stat.) 4300. All the arguments related in this part of the Note apply equally
to the provision for the termination of tenancies in public housing. It also seems unfair to
punish, perhaps with devastating consequences, an entire family for the digressions of one
person. Again, this seems like more of an impulse to lash out against the drug problem without examining the likely results or the overall fairness of the measure.
178. 134 CONG. REC. S15,967 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
179. 134 CONG. REC. H7290 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
180. Senator Kassebaum put it somewhat more succinctly, saying the amendment "creates
more problems than it solves." 134 CONG. REC. S15,976 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement
of Sen. Kassebaum).
181. 134 CONG. REC. H7939 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Weiss).
182. 134 CONG. REC. H7938 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Vento).
183. Low income neighborhoods suffer the worst from the drug problem, yet the measures
designed to attack the problem often seem only to punish the victims even more. See
Nadelmann, The Case for Legalization, 92 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3, 18-19 (1988).
184. See Nadelmann, supra note 183, at 14-18.
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way out of the drug problem, an approach that has met with little more
than failure. 1 85 This close-minded view of how to approach social
problems contributes to a lack of hope on the part of many people and to
186
a lack of respect for a political process that shuts many out.
This Amendment has equal protection infirmities as well. It unfairly targets poorer individuals who rely most on federal benefits. It "is
discriminatory. [For example i]t could unfairly punish poor students
who could not attend a postsecondary institution without federal financial aid. It would not affect those who have the means to attend college
87
without Federal aid."
Another concern is how these provisions would be enforced by the
agencies, and the "paperwork, delay and cost to the institutions and
needy students" of background checks. 188 To effectively implement these
programs, federal agencies would need to verify that applicants have not
become ineligible for federal aid. These checks are likely to infringe on
the privacy rights of many individuals, because federal agencies need to
either question applicants about criminal convictions or receive this information directly from the courts. In its rush to pass this bill Congress
shrugged off these concerns saying they were not "going to get into a
89
legal debate."'
The detrimental effect of the denial of federal benefits is further illustrated by examining whether this provision furthers penal policy. In
the next part, this Note considers whether the denial of federal benefits is
consistent with the goals of penal policy.
B.

The McCollum Amendment and Established Penal Policy

In general, the goals of punishment are recognized to be deterrence,
incapacitation, retribution, and rehabilitation. 90 Uniformity in sentencing and proportionate sentences based on the culpability of the offender
185. As one school teacher put it, "So many people say, 'Say no to drugs.' Well, what do
we say yes to?" N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1989, at BI, col.2.
186. As Senator Bumpers argued,
If we insist on [passing this amendment,] it is not he who will suffer, it is we who will
suffer. Because he has no choice but to go back doing the only thing he knows how
to do, and that is to traffic in drugs. Who then will think that an amendment that
denies him any opportunity to better himself and to develop skills other than the
skills of crime.
134 CONG. REC. S15,972 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
187. 134 CONG. REC. S15,976 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Pell).
188. 134 CONG. REC. S15,976 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum).
She continues, "[The costs] do not justify the potential benefits." Id.
189. 134 CONG. REC. 15,973 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
190. The recently revised, Sentencing Guidelines for U.S. Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,045,
18,047 (1987), written by the United States Sentencing Commission, was designed to promote
guidelines which "further the basic purposes of criminal punishment by deterring crime, incapacitating the offender, providing just punishment, and rehabilitating the offender."
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are necessary to effectuate these goals. 19 1 The additional sanction of a

denial of federal benefits undermines these fundamental principles underlying the sanctions imposed by the criminal justice system.
In passing the provision for the denial of federal benefits, the major
objective of Congress was to deter drug use and trafficking. 92 There
was, however, no study of the value of this measure as a possible deterrent. 193 Most significantly, a wide array of serious criminal penalties already are provided to deter Americans from using drugs. In the words of
Senator Bumpers, "If strong criminal penalties do not provide a deterrent, I am not convinced the loss of Federal benefits will."' 94 Indeed, the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act contains many stiff new criminal penalties that are
"tough for users ... [and] tough for traffickers."'' 95 In the face of the
long prison sentences and severe criminal fines already in place, it is difficult to imagine the possible loss of federal benefits having an effect.
The measure is not well thought out. Rather, it is a product of the
desire to pile on a variety of punishments in an attempt to legislate away
the drug problem. 196 On the floor of the Senate, the major proponents of
the bill were unaware of existing penalties. 97 Nevertheless, they were
convinced that this additional sanction was needed. Similar to the provi191. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (Deering Supp. 1988). As the Sentencing Guidelines,
supra note 190, indicate, Congress in passing the 1984 Crime Control Act also sought uniformity in sentencing and proportionality based on the severity of criminal offenses. 52 Fed. Reg. at
18,048.
192. Representative McCollum stated that the purpose "of the Amendment ... is to add a
deterrent." 134 CONG. REC. H7289 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
193. See supra text accompanying note 56-63.
194. 134 CONG. REC. S15,970 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). Representative Cardin argued:
[O]ur nation already has a user accountability system in place. Those who possess or
use drugs in violation of the law are subject to jail terms and fines. In fact, the same
system of accountability applies to almost every criminal act including murder, robbery and so forth.
This amendment would add to our current system of justice a variety of postconviction penalties, not for all criminals, just for drug offenders. Apparently, proponents of this amendment feel that our judicial system imposes appropriate
sentences in all instances except for drug crimes.
134 CONG. REC. H7290-91 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep. Cardin).
195. Id.
196. As Representative Stark described it, "Predictably we have fallen victim to the biannual lust for drug bill demagoguery." 134 CONG. REc. H7939 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Stark). Senator Bumpers complained that the denial of federal benefits was an
example of sacrificing constitutional protections "just to grow hair on your chest ... send out
press releases and tell everyone how tough you are on drugs." 134 CONG. REC. 15,971 (daily
ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). See also supra text accompanying notes 39-66.
197. After an exchange in which Senator Bumpers asked Senator Gramm if he was aware
of existing penalties and Senator Gramm was unable to answer, Senator Specter responded, "I
would think if a proponent of an amendment, an additional penalty, is going to bring it to the
floor, there would be some knowledge of what the existing penalties are." 134 CONG. REC.
S15,966 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Specter). Senator Specter sent out an
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sion for civil penalties, the denial of benefits stemmed from a perception
that "we have crime without punishment for people who are using
drugs."'' 9 There was no study, however, to confirm a lack of prosecution of drug users by the states-who have primary responsibility for
enforcement of laws against illegal drugs. Despite the concerns of some
members of Congress about overcrowded jails, drug users still can be
punished and deterred by the imposition of a sentence, even probation,
and the resulting criminal record. Also, even short jail terms of a few
days would have an effect, if states chose to impose them.
Another purpose of Congress in passing this Amendment was retribution. Some members of Congress saw it is an attack on "greed soaked
mutants who deal in illegal drugs."' 199 This impulse to lash out at people
in an effort to halt the drug problem is understandable as an initial reaction, but is an irresponsible basis for passing federal legislation. Retribution plays a part in criminal law, but emotional impulses should be
controlled and legislation should reflect considered judgment. Sweeping
condemnations of drug users ignore widespread drug use in society, and
legislation based on "[m]oral adjurations vulnerable to a charge of hypocrisy [is] self-defeating [and] tends to breed a cynicism and indifference
' '2
to the criminal-law processes. 00
The legislation also does not further the goal of incapacitation. As
outlined above, 20 1 neither does it further the goal of rehabilitation, because it denies individuals aid while they would be trying to reintegrate
themselves. It does the opposite; it hinders rehabilitation.
Uniformity and proportionality in sentencing are acknowledged as
two additional goals of punishment.2 0 2 Denial of federal benefits runs
counter to these goals. The penalty is not uniform in relation to
sentences for other crimes and the effect of the sanction can be extremely
disproportionate. For example, two college students could be arrested,
one for stealing a stereo and the other for smoking marijuana. While the
first would likely receive probation and remain in school, the second may
assistant to research federal law for existing penalties, and challenged proponents to answer
the question before his assistant returned. None could. Id.
198. 134 CONG. REC. S15,966 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
199. 134 CONG. REC. S15,978 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Heflin). Statements like the following are typical illustrations of the emotional, retributive impulse of Congress: "In a very real sense, the drug abuser's recreational habit pays for the bullets that kill
police officers and innocent bystanders in the drug war, and even the bomb that threatened our
Secretary of State in Columbia." 134 CONG. REC.S17,307 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement
of Sen. McConnell).
200. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157 (1967), reprinted in S.
KADISH, S. SCHULFOFER, M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 243-44 (4th ed.
1983). Professor Kadish also specifically discusses the dangers of overcriminalization in the
context of narcotics control. Id. at 245-46.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 174-82.
202. See supra note 191.
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be forced to withdraw from college if the federal aid he depends on is
denied in the future.
The provision for the denial of federal benefits ignores the need for
uniformity in the criminal justice system. As one member of the House
Judiciary Committee said, "[It] would abandon those processes of [the
U.S. Sentencing Commission designed to impose equity in our sentencing
process] established just 4 years ago, and selectively impose postconviction penalties. ' 20 3 Instead of considering the punishment of criminal offenses in the context of the complete system, Congress has adopted a
piecemeal approach.
The dramatic variations in the severity of the sanction's effect pose a
significant problem. Not only may the denial of federal benefits impose a
severe hardship on lower income groups, but the denial or revocation of a
federal license or contract could be a harsh and unfair penalty. People
who depend on federal licenses or contracts for their business or employment are subject to a stiffer sanction. A proponent of the Amendment
recognized this potential saying, "if you have a license to operate a radio
station and you are smoking marijuana, you are subject to losing that
license. ' '2° 4 Punishment unequal in its application and dependent on the
fortuity of circumstances has an unduly severe effect. Two individuals
could be guilty of the same offense, smoking marijuana, and yet because
one depends upon a federal license for employment she may be penalized
20 5
much more severely.
In addition, these postconviction penalties apply only to drug use
and not to other crimes that can easily be considered more morally reprehensible, such as rape or murder. The penalty is disproportionate to the
crime and is based on current political pressures and not the culpability
of behavior. 20 6 Congress should not dispense with a uniform and cohesive system of criminal penalties by imposing this additional penalty in
the case of drug crimes.
C. The Amendment Violates the Principles of Federalism
Another major problem is that the McCollum Amendment violates
the rights of states to administer their own criminal laws. The denial of
203. 134 CONG. REC. H7291 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep. Cardin).
204. .134 CONG. REC. S15,969 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen Gramm). Senator Gramm also provided another example: "If the farmer wants to enter into a contract with
the Federal Government-for instance, through the Soil Conservation Service-and if that
person is convicted of drug use, then the judge could deny him that benefit for up to a year."
Id. at S15,973.
205. See Clark, supra note 93, at 404 ("the loss of a professional license may cause considerably more severe consequences than a short jail sentence").
206. As Representative Weiss argues, "On a practical level, this amendment makes little
sense, since its penalties are not related to the underlying offenses."

(daily ed. Sept. 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Weiss).

134 CONG. REC. 7939
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federal benefits supplements existing penalties, primarily state laws. This
imposition of an additional penalty for state crimes infringes on state
jurisdiction. "Every State has its own laws .... defines what is illegal and
specifies what the penalty is. ' '2 ° 7 The States of Oregon and California,
for example, provide that the possession of personal use amounts of certain drugs is only a citable offense. 20 8 The legislatures of the States have
decided the appropriate range of punishment for drug offenses committed in their states. The federal government should not grant individual
state judges the authority to disregard state law and punish individuals
more severely. As written, the Amendment purports to give judges this
authority, 20 9 but it seems that this "cannot be done under our system of
'210
Federalism and our system of laws."
In any event, the federal government should respect the provinces of
the states to enact their own criminal laws. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that "the United States may impose cumulative penalties above and beyond those specified by State law for infractions of the
State's criminal code by its own citizens."12 1' Yet this is exactly what
Congress is trying to do by allowing state judges to impose the additional
sanction of the denial of federal benefits to individuals convicted of state
crimes. The Supreme Court warned that allowing Congress to add additional penalties for state crimes would "open the door to unlimited regulation of matters of state concern by federal authority. ' 21 2 Certainly,
Congress should not disregard the domain of state criminal3 law protected
21
by our system of federalism and the tenth amendment.
For the above reasons, Congress should repeal this section before
September 1, 1989, the scheduled date of implementation. At the very
least, Congress should delay the effective date of the Amendment further
and subject the proposal to more adequate scrutiny. Without the pressures of an election year, Congress should be able to re-evaluate this proposal more objectively.
IV.

Conclusion

There are no simple answers to the problem of drug abuse. Unfortunately, the recent approaches have added new concerns to the problem207. 134 CONG. REC. S15,975 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Specter). See
also supra note 166.
208. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357(b) (Deering 1984); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 161.705 (1985).
209. 21 U.S.C.A. § 253a(a-b) (West Supp. 1989). This section provides that individuals
"convicted of any Federal or state offense" may be denied benefits at "the discretion of the
court." Id.
210. 134 CONG. REC. S15,975 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Specter).
211. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935).
212. Id.
213. Id.

August 1989]

THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1988

that individual rights will be trampled and the criminal justice system
dismembered. In a rush to take action, Congress has "fallen victim to
the biannual lust for drug bill demagoguery" 214 and disappointed those
who had a "glimmer of hope [for] a small change of direction in our
Nation's drug policy. ' 2 15 The imposition of civil fines without criminal
due process protections may saddle individuals with undeserved drug
dispositions. The denial of federal benefits may condemn individuals to a
cycle of poverty and inhibit rehabilitation.
These provisions are part of a pattern of dangerous curtailments of
basic rights through draconian enforcement measures, punishments, and
sentencing procedures. For example, President Bush is proposing publishing the names of drug users in the newspaper, sending first-time offenders to boot camps, and denying driver's licenses and scholarships to
drug users. 2 16 Indeed, Professor Steven Wisotsky warned in 1987 that
growing efforts to prosecute drug offenses would result in further infringements on civil liberties and the due process rights of criminal defendants, including prosecutions and sanctions through the civil
system. 21 7 Ironically, these measures are self-defeating and serve to divert attention away from exploring different measures that could be more
successful. They certainly have not brought us closer to victory in the
war on drugs. Congress ignored the calls of members that "[w]e cannot
legislate away drug abuse. ' 21 8 Congress cannot merely pass legislation
and hope to fight a social problem so deeply embedded in our society.
The civil fines and denial of federal benefits are a product of the
crackdown on drugs, but such measures may spread to other areas of
criminal law before they are adequately considered. Congress should reconsider the provision to impose civil fines and should repeal the Amendment providing for the denial of federal benefits before it becomes
effective. In any case, the courts should strike down the provision for
civil fines as an unconstitutional imposition of criminal penalties without
the due process of law.

214. 134 CONG. REC. H7939 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Stark).'
215. Id.

216. Bush alters tactics in drug war, San Francisco Examiner, August 15, 1989, at A20,
col. 1.
217. Professor Wisotsky predicted that Congress would try to "bypass entirely the cumbersome criminal justice system, with its tedious set of impediments to investigation, prosecu-

tion, and conviction, and substitute a control system consisting of civil sanctions: fines, asset
seizures and forfeitures." Wisotsky, supra note 23, at 925. Professor Wisotsky's article reviews the threat to constitutional protections posed by the war on drugs.
218.

134 CONG. REC. H7938 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Vento).

